Blowback: Intelligence Operations During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989)

By Galahad

"If we load up our leaders with this sort of analysis, their heads will explode."

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This summation of the political situation of Afghanistan in 1978 by Aleksandr Orlov-Morozov, Deputy Station Chief of the KGB in Kabul, indicates the nation’s complexity even before the invasion of the Red Army on Christmas Eve 1979. [1] For millennia, the area which is now Afghanistan has seen off attempts at its conquest. In 327 BC, Alexander the Great barely escaped the Kunar Valley with his life after having been struck by an arrow, and likely married Roxana in an attempt to pacify the Bactrian tribes occupying the Hidu Kush. [2] More recently Afghanistan played host to ‘The Great Game’, the contest between the British and Russian Empires for supremacy in the region. When the British found their position in Kabul untenable at the end of the first Anglo-Afghan War, they attempted to retreat in column to Jalalabad some 100 miles away with 16,500 soldiers and civilians. Over the course of a week from January 6 to January 13 1842, the column was wiped out. Only one Briton, William Brydon, an assistant surgeon in the East India Company, made it to Jalalabad unmolested. [3] The British experience of Afghanistan inspired a verse in Rudyard Kipling’s poem ‘The Young British Soldier’:

“When you’re wounded and left on Afghanistan’s plains, and the women come out to cut up what remains, jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains an’ go to your Gawd like a soldier” [4]

Afghanistan has more than earned its moniker: ‘the Graveyard of Empires’. 

It is perhaps little surprise then that, despite the overwhelming international condemnation of the Soviet invasion, it was predicted that few nations would go “further than their vote in the UN resolution.” [5] According to analysis performed by the CIA, most nations saw Afghanistan as “a problem between the superpowers in which they should not become involved.” [6] Of the nations that did involve themselves, a coalition of the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia took the lead. Their efforts formed the backbone of Operation Cyclone, the codename for the program through which the mujahadin—holy warriors fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan—would be armed and financed. This dissertation will examine the why these nations involved themselves in this covert action, what form their action took, how they contributed to the defeat of the Soviet Union, and the consequences of their actions in the years after the conflict.
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“It should now be generally accepted that the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 was deliberately provoked by the United States.” [7] This is, at least, according to Chalmers Johnson, one of the foremost authorities on the concept of ‘blowback’. For him, blowback:

“…does not just mean retaliation for the things our government has done to and in foreign countries. It refers to retaliation for the numerous illegal operations we have carried out abroad that were kept totally secret from the American public. This means that when the retaliation comes – as it did so spectacularly on September 11th, 2001 – the American Public is unable to put these events in context. So they tend to support acts intended to lash out against the perpetrators, thereby most commonly preparing the ground for yet another cycle of blowback.” [8]

For a period of such importance, the Soviet-Afghan War is often overlooked. However, 9/11 spawned a renewed interest in Afghanistan and the role that Western powers (especially the US) have previously played in the region. As such, there is a broad literature on the US role in the conflict, much of which has been published in the last 20 years, and much of which has benefitted from the recent declassification of documents from the US Government.

Steve Coll, in his work Ghost Wars, provides a the most comprehensive account of the Soviet-Afghan War and its aftermath. His work is unique in so far as he has personally interviewed many of the most important actors in the Soviet-Afghan War, something which has been crucial to obtaining a more detailed representation of the conflict. Through the use of this privileged access, Coll’s account provides a harsher critique of the actions of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia at the end of the Soviet-Afghan War and leadup to 9/11. His argument stands in contrast to the 9/11 Commission’s Report, which Coll argues is “generous toward the Saudi government and the Pakistan Army”, with the commissioners managing their criticisms of Riyadh and Islamabad “with future American counterterrorism partnerships in mind.” [9]

Chalmers Johnson’s ‘Blowback series’, comprising of Blowback, The Sorrows of Empire, Nemesis, and Dismantling the Empire is more assertive than Coll in his conclusion that the United States bears a large portion of the blame for not only the current state of the Middle East, but 9/11 itself. According to him, one can a trace a direct line between “the attacks on 11 September 2001—the most significant instance of blowback in the history of the CIA—and the events of 1979.” [10] His are more specific attacks against the actions of successive governments of the United States, rather than in depth studies of the Soviet-Afghan War.

As for a specific episode of the covert action, Charlie Wilson’s War by George Crile offers an intimate examination of the ‘Stinger Missile Crisis’, and of one of the war’s most enduring characters. Much like Ghost Wars, Charlie Wilson’s War utilizes interviews and privileged access to sources to construct a detailed and engaging narrative which sheds light on the ‘under-the-table’ nature of the politics of covert action. Crile’s account is immediately more favorable to the US, although he concedes that all significant events have “unintended consequences”, and that it is undoubtedly the case that the Soviet-Afghan War “awakened the dormant dreams and visions of Islam.” [11]

Due to the resurgence in interest in Afghanistan as a result of 9/11, there is a historiographical imbalance when it comes to the roles of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the conflict. As a result, secondary literature on the Pakistan and Saudi Arabian sections of this dissertation largely comes from academic essays. However, as the Soviet-Afghan War was one of Pakistan’s most important foreign policy focuses since the nation’s birth, there is copious debate regarding the costs and benefits of the Pakistani intervention. 
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This historiographical imbalance is also reflected in the choice of primary sources. Extracting primary material direct from the Pakistani and Saudi Arabian intelligence agencies (ISI and GID) was impossible, and neither government possesses declassified archives of any sort. As a result, this dissertation has relied extensively on the records of the Office of the Historian, the National Security Archive, and other declassified material direct from the CIA.

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Chapter One

"We cannot afford to lose Afghanistan"

The following chapter will examine what motivated the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko to make this statement in a meeting of the Soviet Presidium. [12] As such, the following will also seek to explain why the United States was so keen to deny Afghanistan to the Soviet Union.

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The Soviet-Afghan War commenced amidst confusion. It has its beginnings in faulty intelligence and an inability to understand the religious, cultural, and political traditions and institutions in the region which came to plague both the US and the Soviet Union.

In the two decades leading up to 1978, the Soviet Union through the KGB had been supporting communists in leadership positions within Afghan universities and the Afghan Army. It is estimated that there were over 3,500 military personnel whose loyalties lay with the hammer and sickle, rather than the Afghan tricolor. [13] These Soviet aligned troops overthrew the Afghan President Mohammed Daoud in April 1978, and at the behest of their KGB handlers, launched a bloody campaign to eliminate all those who could threaten communist rule. By 1978 up to 12,000 political prisoners had been jailed, with religious and social leaders making up most of the numbers. [14] Many were executed.

The Soviet Union’s fatal error in Afghanistan was its underestimation of the power of religion and tradition. Its secular reforms provoked even the most moderate Afghani Muslims. Directives from Moscow via Kabul outlawed dowries and Islamic lending systems, and implemented conscription, land seizures, and universal education, controversially including women. This socialist education and its exclusion of religion provoked the ire of a nation which had been dominated by Islam since the 9th Century. [15] A nation-state in name only, Soviet leaders who had learned their trade in a world of West vs. East, and capitalism vs. communism, could not comprehend the complexities of Afghanistan. [16]

These decrees could not have come at a more dangerous time. Inspired by the Iranian Revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power, radical Shia activists began to cross the border into Afghanistan. The first signs of rebellion were found here, at the town of Herat on the Iranian Afghan border, in March 1979. A young army captain named Ismail Khan, outraged by ongoing religious persecution, led his garrison in a mutiny and began a jihad against the communist government. The future Governor of Herat Province, along with his troops, hacked to death dozens of communist advisors and their families, nearing a hundred in total. [17] As a result the Soviets sanctioned a response which would become a feature of their future campaign in Afghanistan. They razed Herat with vicious bombing runs, inflicting some 20,000 casualties. [18]

Searching for an explanation for the suddenness of the uprising, the Soviets were quick to look abroad. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union on March 17, 1979, Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, argued that the insurgents in Herat had been trained and armed “not only with the participation of Pakistani forces, but also of China, the United States of America and Iran”, [19] making them responsible for the atrocities in Herat. As regards US intervention, this is untrue. President Carter did not authorize the CIA to send money to the Mujahadin until July 3, 1979, at which point $500,000 was spent on propaganda, radio equipment, and medical supplies. [20] Eventually, the Politburo came to identify themselves and the communist regime and Kabul as part of the problem, stating in a June 28, 1979 report that “Taraki and Amin… none too rarely make mistakes and commit violations of legality”, that “local bodies of revolutionary authority have not yet been created” and that the “recommendations of our advisors regarding these questions have not been put into practice.” [21]

The situation soon deteriorated. In Kabul, Afghan President Nur Muhammed Taraki (who had bestowed upon himself the title ‘Great Teacher’) was overthrown in true Leninist style. The Communist Party had descended into factionalism, and a rival to the ‘Great Teacher’ had emerged in Hafizullah Amin. Although highly unpopular with the Politburo, Amin managed to overthrow Taraki, executing him on October 8, 1979. Although both had been directly funded by the KGB for years, Amin had steadily moved away from pursuing policy lines dictated by the Politburo as he gained power. He had at one point asked his Soviet advisor to withdraw Afghanistan’s sovereign wealth fund (containing some $400 million) and place it into his personal account. [22]
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After Amin’s coup, the CIA detected a surge in activity along the Soviet-Afghan border. Reports detailed that the 105thGuards Airborne Division in the Turkestan Military District (now Uzbekistan) had been placed on full alert. [23] Although still skeptical of a full invasion, analysts correctly predicted that:

​“In expanding their own involvement in Afghanistan, there is a danger that the Soviets… will amplify their own stake in the ultimate outcome, making it increasingly difficult for them to resist raising the level of their participation still another notch should they feel it necessary.” [24]

By the end of 1979, the Soviet Union could no longer tolerate the situation in Afghanistan. Thanks to defectors from the Afghan Army, the Mujahadin numbered some 40,000, and were able to launch combat operations in 16 of the then 27 provinces of Afghanistan. The Amin regime only completely controlled the provinces of Kabul, Kunduz, and Baghlan. [25] On December 12, the CC CPSU agreed to “the execution of measures” … in “A.” [26]  These ‘measures’ entailed a KGB assault on Tajbeg Palace (Amin’s residence) in which Amin and his son were killed, the appointment of Babrak Karmal in his place, and the invasion of Afghanistan. [27]
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There is a debate regarding the objectives and victory conditions of Operation Cyclone. In September 1979, just three months before the Soviet Invasion, a top-secret memo was sent by Thomas Thornton to President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Entitled “What Are the Soviets Doing in Afghanistan?”, it was an amalgamation of all existing intelligence on the country. It began, “Simply, we don’t know.” [28]

Off the back of this, Steve Coll has argued that any suggestion of an American plan to lure the Soviets into Afghanistan and start a new Vietnam “warrants deep skepticism.” [29] This assertion can be found in evidence, as Brzezinski cautioned President Carter that “the initial effects of the intervention are likely to be adverse for us”, and that the US “should not be too sanguine about Afghanistan becoming a Soviet Vietnam.” [30] However, Peter Dale Scott contends that Brzezinski, President Carter’s top cold warrior, “consistently exaggerated the Soviet menace beyond what saner heads at the time were estimating” and that “we should not believe what he wrote.” [31]

Brzezinski’s comments in 1998 offer some clarification. When asked if he had any regrets, Brzezinski replied: “Regret what? The secret operation was an excellent idea. It drew the Russians into the Afghan trap, and you want me to regret it?” [32] He further explained that although the US didn’t make the Soviet Union intervene, by beginning their supply of the mujahadin in July 1979, they “knowingly increased the probability that it would.” [33] If Brzezinski is to be believed, then the US succeeded in drawing the Soviet Union into the Afghan trap. The means and methods by which they would be kept there would range from the sublime to the ridiculous.

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Chapter Two
​The United States of America; Sting in the Tail

​“Don’t fuck it up, just go out there and kill Soviets, and take care of the Pakistanis and make them do whatever you need to make them do.” [34]

This is how the CIA Chief of Station in Islamabad Howard Hart understood his orders from Washington D.C. and was in effect the CIA strategy for the Soviet-Afghan War. An analysis of the US’ role in the conflict is vital if one is to understand the final fall of the Soviet Union, and the rise of organizations such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The way in which the US conducted their operations, and the sudden manner in which they washed their hands of Afghanistan left an unstable and crippled nation, out of which grew new threats to the west. [35]

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Aid from the US to the mujahadin started off in rather modest fashion compared to the form that intervention would later take. According to the CIA, in the first six months of war (December 1979 to June 1980) the US had supplied some $30 million of equipment. This included some 4000 AK-47s, 1200 Lee Enfield Rifles, 150 RPG-7s, and 7 million rounds of ammunition of various calibers, with double that amount expected in the next three months. [36] The method through which these weapons reached the mujahadin was complex. The arms originated in Egypt before being flown to Saudi Arabia. From there, the Saudis used their Hercules C-130 cargo aircraft to transport the munitions to Pakistan, where they were claimed by the ISI and smuggled over the Hindu Kush with the help of the mujahadin themselves. [37] This convoluted system was organized so that the US could still maintain a crucial “fig leaf of deniability.” [38] In the early years of Operation Cyclone, the US was eager to avoid publicity, for fear of Soviet escalation and reprisals. It is for this reason that for the first years of the conflict, none of the weapons supplied to the mujahadin were sourced from US stock—almost all were from Eastern Bloc nations. [39]
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Attempts to keep covert operations covert ended after 1980, when President Carter failed in his re-election bid, and Ronald Reagan acceded to the White House. With President Reagan came his doctrine, stating that the US would support “those who are risking their lives – on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua – to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have been ours since birth.” [40] This escalation led to arguably the most well publicized episode of the conflict, and one of the most infamous covert operations of all time. Immortalized in the film ‘Charlie Wilson’s War’ (based on the book by George Crile), the mujahadin’s acquisition of Stingers is seen by many as a turning point of the Soviet-Afghan War, and indeed of the whole Cold War, as it is likely that this is the first time American weapons were supplied with the specific purpose of killing Soviet troops. [41] In National Security Decision Directive 166 (a document that has never been fully declassified) President Reagan authorized the CIA to support the mujahadin “by all means available.” [42] Along with Stingers, monetary support rose from $122 million in 1984, to $250 million in 1985, to $470 million in 1986, and $630 million in 1987. [43]

There is a debate over both the long term and short-term impact of Stinger missiles. Some were encouraged by reports of Stinger usage in Afghanistan. A heavily redacted report from the Commander of US Army Special Operations, stated that the impact of the Stinger has “favored the mujahadin, and altered the application of air power.” [44] Furthermore, “more jets have been shot down with heavy machine guns since January 1987 than in any similar previous period” [45], owing to the fact that low level approaches from the Soviet Airforce were more common. These field reports tallied with concerns that the Soviets were relaying in talks between them, the US and Pakistan. In 1987, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost relayed to Secretary of State George Schultz that the Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan Yuli Voronstov “conceded that Soviet aircraft losses are up” and that he “registered concern with reports of additional Stinger deliveries.” [46]

The reported effectiveness of the Stinger has led some to argue that its introduction into the conflict was the tipping point, after which Soviet failure was inevitable. Milton Bearden, CIA Station Chief in Pakistan by the end of the war, that the effect of the first Soviet helicopters being downed by Stinger missiles was “electric”, and that within days, “the setbacks for Soviet forces were snowballing.” [47] Likewise, Peter Rodman, President Reagan’s Deputy National Security Advisor, has argued that “the escalation of US military aid to the Mujahadin, especially the furnishing of “Stinger anti-aircraft missiles” [48] played a crucial role in bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. However, Alan Kuperman has been far more circumspect in his appraisal of the effect of Stinger missiles. He makes use of the fact that, unbeknownst to the US, Mikhail Gorbachev was attempting to remove the Soviet Union from Afghanistan the moment he came into office in March 1985, months before the first Stingers arrived in Afghanistan. [49]

Likewise, former high-ranking Soviets have maintained that US escalation did not provoke a Soviet withdrawal. Aleksandr Yakovlev, an advisor of Gorbachev, the Stinger “played no role. None” [50] in the cessation of hostilities. Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze even argued that the Stinger “definitely prolonged our stay”, as it “made our hawks more determined than ever not to withdraw, not to appear to be giving into duress.” [51] From these reports, it seems to be that although the Stinger had an immediate military impact on the conflict, through the downing of helicopters and the forcing of the Soviets to change strategy, that it did not contribute to an early conclusion of the conflict, and might have in fact prolonged it. 

This begs the question: what purpose did the weapons and money the US sent the mujahadin serve? An argument must be made that they provided the means with which a new generation of ideological enemies, this time Islamic fundamentalists, could begin their own global war. Terrorism was never on the radar of the US government, and there is little indication they had an understanding of the extremist forces they were unleashing. A memo, written in September 1980, details that the strength of tradition and Islam in Afghanistan and Pakistan dictates that any modern ideas, whether communist or Western, are seen as a threat, [52] but this is the extent to which the CIA worried about exactly who they were empowering. The US understood that religion was an important weapon against the Soviet Union, but they never believed it could one day be turned against them. 

Ahmed Rashid sums up the fallout from Operation Cyclone thusly: 

​“With the active encouragement of the CIA… some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 40 Islamic countries joined Afghanistan’s fight. Tens of thousands more came to study in Pakistan’s madrasahs. The camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan where they trained became virtual universities for promoting pan-Islamic radicalism. Americans only woke up to the danger in 1993, when Afghan-trained Arab militants blew up the World Trade Center… the bombers believed that, just as Afghanistan had defeated one superpower—the Soviet Union—they would defeat a second.” [53]

​According to Charlie Wilson, who, perhaps more than anyone, influenced the decision to escalate Operation Cyclone, the US “fucked up the endgame.” [54] It is a mistake to say there was one. By the time the Soviet Union withdrew its last armed forces on the 15th of February 1989, events were unfolding in Eastern Europe that beckoned the end of the Soviet Union, and thus distracted the US from Afghanistan. It returned to its pre-1979 policy towards Afghanistan, which comprised of “some humanitarian and economic aid” [55] but little in the way of policy focus. With up to a quarter of the Afghan population in refugee camps and the nation’s infrastructure decimated by a decade of war, Afghanistan descended into an anarchy from which it is yet to truly recover. [56]

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Chapter Three: Pakistan

"The water must boil at the right temperature"

​The above quote is from President of Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq, referencing the delicate balance of power within the mujahadin which needed to be maintained for Pakistani foreign policy goals to be met. [57] This chapter will examine the means and methods with which they, through the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence bureau) attempted to control the outcome of the Soviet Afghan-War and analyze the consequences of their policies.

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​There is a consensus that without Pakistan, the mujahadin could not have defeated the Soviet Union. Marvin G. Weinbaum argues that without Pakistani involvement, “there could have been no effective Afghan resistance”, [58] and Peter Dale Scott has labelled the ISI the gatekeepers of the Soviet-Afghan War. [59] President Zia, via the ISI, decided which mujahadin groups would receive the lion’s share of supplies and training. 

Pakistan was suffering from both internal and external instability. Since the Soviet invasion, Pakistan in effect shared a porous border with the Soviet Union, and since India still presented a threat from the east, Pakistan was under threat. As early as May 1978, Zia had warned Carter that “the advent of the leftist regime in Kabul is an event of historic proportions”, and that India’s close relationship with the Soviet Union meant that it would “act in tandem with it.” [60] As such, Zia had two primary objectives. First, ensure the removal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Second, use the Afghan conflict to consolidate and solidify his regime at home by establishing a friendly, quasi-client state in Afghanistan and take advantage of Pakistan’s role in the conflict to secure aid and concessions from the international community. [61]

The latter was the easiest to accomplish, as Zia took full advantage of his nation’s status as lynchpin in Operation Cyclone. Aid commenced slowly in 1980, with “military sales resumed and facilitated”, “the supply of 2 GEARING-class destroyers”, and “additional assistance… to help deal with the Afghan refugee problem.” [62] This aid program was later expanded to include $3.2 billion and permission to by F-16 fighter jets, despite warnings from the CIA that this technology would be shared with China, and despite the fact that Zia had been breaking his promises over Pakistan’s nuclear program. [63] [64] These concerns where shared by Carter who initially hesitated to send the fighter jets, but he was persuaded otherwise by Brzezinski, who argued that “the F-16 is all that we have to put in the pot with Zia.” [65] Ultimately, the sale went through with the acknowledgement that the top secret technology in the F-16 would end up in unfriendly hands. Only after the close of the Soviet-Afghan War did this “wink-and-nod policy towards Pakistan’s transfer of Washington’s technology to Beijing” [66] come to an end. 

Zia’s domestic empowerment had several consequences for Pakistan. Although Zia was said to be “too much a politician to have the fundamentalist’s fervor”, [67] he built an internal alliance between “the military and the mullahs.” [68] Zia had made no secret of plans to render inseparable Islam and the Pakistani State, once saying that since Pakistan was “created on the basis of Islam”, that without it, “Pakistan would fail.” [69] As he took official control of the Presidency in September 1978 (after having been Chief Martial Law Enforcer since July 1977), the US accepted that Zia would pursue a program of “Islamicization”, [70] but hoped that it would act as a “legitimating force with which to build national unity.” [71] This never came to fruition, as Zia used the mullahs to target secular political rivals. According to Irjaz Ahmad Khan, Zia’s introduction of rigid interpretations of Islamic injunctions and jurisprudence contributed to a legacy that “continues to haunt the state and society of Pakistan”, [72] thanks to “external assistance which secure(d) its very survival as a nation.”[73]

Inextricably linked between the domestic bolstering of Islamism was the way in which Zia and the ISI chose to favor specific mujahadin groups in Afghanistan. The CIA had struggled to complete a full picture of the many factions of the mujahadin, admitting that their information on the insurgency was “uneven in quality and far from complete.” [74] They could not compile “reliable information on which to base an estimate of insurgent strength” [75] due to the “possibly hundred” [76] insurgent groups in operation. The US also recognized that “without Zia’s support, the Afghan resistance, key to making the Soviets pay a heavy price for their Afghan adventure, is [sic] effectively dead” [77] so they were happy to acquiesce to his demands to control arms and cash flow into Afghanistan. The mujahadin became “tools of Pakistan’s Afghan policy”, [78] giving Zia control over the political destiny of Afghanistan.

By 1982, Zia and the ISI had managed to merge some 80 separate mujahadin groups into seven Islamic and two secular parties, through a combination of bribery and politicking. [79] The seven Islamic factions (Hizb-e-Islami, Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, Harakat Inqilab-e-Islam, Jamiat-e-Islami, National Islamic Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan, and National Liberation Front of Sibghatullah Mojaddedi) made up the Peshawar Alliance. The two secular parties, Afghan Millat and Shola-e-Javed, were ignored by Pakistan. [80] Zia had little time for non-religious, nationalist, and democratic forces, who had been considered a threat to Pakistan since its inception.

Over time, Hizb-e-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, became the ISI’s most favored party. From a Pakistani perspective, Hizb-e-Islami was a perfect tool with which to forge a new Afghanistan, amenable to Pakistani policy. Hekmatyar had been waging Jihad against one Afghani regime or another since the early 70s, much of which from exile in Pakistan, and his organization was considered to be “one of the best organized and most active” [81] in Afghanistan. Ideologically, in Hekmatyar, Zia had found an ally who shared his anti-communist zeal, and a leader who was already friendly with the Jamaat-I Islami Party of Pakistan, a close domestic ally. [82] This favoritism revealed itself most prominently in the allocation of US sourced weapons. Despite espousing increasingly vehement anti-US sentiment, it is estimated that of the millions of rounds of ammunition, thousands of rifles, and hundreds of mines and missiles, [83] Hizb-e-Islami received 20-25% of the total. [84] According to ISI Brigadier Mohammad Yousuf, who worked closely with Hekmatyar, the ISI felt as if they “could rely on him blindly.” [85]

If the ISI was blind, the CIA was certainly in the dark. They underestimated both the size and importance of exile groups and had little understanding of their views. According to them, the exiled parties (of which Hizb-e-Islami was one) were “perhaps the least important of the insurgent groups.” [86] Not only this, but the CIA had judged Hizb-e-Islami to be “more secular in outlook” than other groups. [87] Hekmatyar had been a committed fundamentalist for most of his adult life, having studied under Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdul Rasul Sayyaff at Kabul University, two prominent Islamist scholars, both influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and the works of Sayyid Qutb, one of the founders of Salafi jihadism. [88]

This goes to show the extent to which the US was blind to the problems it was creating, and the lengths to which Pakistan would go to promote its interests. William Pikeney, CIA Station Chief in Islamabad from 1984, was prophetic in his assessment of Hekmatyar and the Peshawar Alliance. Like many in Washington and Islamabad he admired Hekmatyar’s ability as a warrior, but he felt uneasy whenever he met the mujahadin leader.

​“I would put my arms around Gulbuddin, and we’d hug, you know, like brothers in combat and stuff, and his coal black eyes would look back at you, and you just knew that there was only one thing holding this team together, and that was the Soviet Union.” [89]

​This is what came to pass. As soon as the Soviet threat passed, what little that united the Mujahadin disappeared, and, according to Shah Tarzi, the “fractured Afghan social structure reasserted its historical pattern by inducing and aggravating disunity and infighting among the muj.” [90] Only now, the dozens of tribes and ethnic groups had hundreds of millions of dollars, advanced training, and advanced weaponry. 

​In the two civil wars that erupted after the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, Hekmatyar moved to systematically eliminate rival mujahadin groups, “serially kidnapping and murdering mujahadin royalists, intellectuals, rival party commanders—anyone who seriously threatened strong alternative leadership.” [91] Hekmatyar turned his US and Pakistani supplied weapons onto the civilian population, and “pounded Kabul with rockets for three years” [92] (1992-1995), inflicting some 25,000 civilian casualties. Eventually, after the US led coalition’s invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Hekmatyar threw in his lot with the Taliban and the remnants of Al-Qaeda and encouraged Hizb-e-Islami mujahadin to fight against their former ally. 

Zia never saw the end of the Soviet-Afghan War. He died in suspicious circumstances in a plane crash in August 1988, six months before the Soviet withdrawal. Nevertheless, the argument can be made that he achieved his immediate objectives. Soviet forces in Afghanistan were removed, domestic opposition was quashed, and the threat from an unfriendly Afghanistan dramatically diminished. However, these immediate successes gave way to profound problems. 

Zia’s alliance with extremists sparked a fundamentalist revival in Pakistan, which continues to contribute to immense sectarian violence. In the 1990s, some 2000 people were estimated to have been killed, and 561 injured in sectarian flashpoints in Punjab alone, the area with the highest number of madressahas (religious schools) in Pakistan. [93] The solidifying of Zia’s rule allowed him to wield absolute power, and corruption in the arms pipeline meant that an estimated 50% of weaponry was stolen or sold, and some 30% of other covert aid went missing, turning Pakistan into one of the world’s largest black markets for arms and ammunition. [94] Pakistan’s leading role in the Soviet-Afghan came at a terrible cost.

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Chapter Four: Saudi Arabia

Jihad for Sale

It was apparent to all nations involved that one of the most powerful weapons in the Soviet-Afghan War would be Islamic solidarity. Middle Eastern nations were only too happy to help counter what was seen as another atheist threat to a Muslim society. This chapter will focus on Saudi Arabian policy, the measures it took to support the mujahadin, and their consequences for Afghanistan and the world.

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​Within the current school of study of the Soviet-Afghan War, Egypt usually takes precedence when analyzing the effect that Arab nations had on the Soviet-Afghan War. This is understandable, as Egypt was among the first to commit to supporting the mujahadin, through weaponry and advisors, and maintained close ties to the US throughout the war. [95] Likewise, from Egypt emerged Islamists who would go on to form the core of the mujahadin, and some, like Ayman al-Zawahiri and Ahmad Shawqi-al Islambuli went on to be founder members of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. [96] However, this has come at the expense of in-depth study of Saudi Arabia which, it must be argued, did more to promote violent fundamentalist Islam in Afghanistan and the broader Middle East than any other nation. 
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Saudi Arabia was eager to help the mujahadin, and equally eager to maintain their alliance with the US. Although judged to be reluctant to provide “any real support” [97] to the mujahadin in 1979 (Crown Prince Fahd had agreed not to send aid without General Zia’s approval), by June 1980, perhaps sensing an opportunity to reaffirm Saudi Arabia’s “privileged relationship” [98] with the US, Crown Prince Fahd had reportedly given his “unstinting support” [99] to Operation Cyclone. In a memo to President Carter, the Director of the CIA Stansfield Turner argued that this show of support would “impart new momentum” [100] to covert operations. Crown Prince Fahd’s decision to match any and all US funding to the mujahadin was to prove of immense value. 

Yet, Crown Prince Fahd and the Director General of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Directorate Prince Turki, were said to be “extremely sensitive” [101] to the nature of this covert action. They praised the “efficiency and security” [102] of the program but wanted to avoid having Saudi Arabia publicly linked with Operation Cyclone. In a meeting with Secretary of State Christopher Warren, Prince Saud claimed that this was in an attempt to avoid further acts of “Soviet imperialism and aggression”, [103] given increasing levels of Soviet influence in North Yemen as a result of arms deals, which Crown Prince Fahd viewed as a direct threat to Saudi Arabia. However, there is another, more important reason as to why Saudi Arabia did not want a close association with Operation Cyclone. 

Saudi Arabia was facing its own domestic problems. Since the late 1950s, Saudi Arabia had been inviting Egyptian radicals, usually Muslim Brotherhood academics from the prestigious al-Azhar University in Cairo, to teach in its own educational institutions. A rapidly modernizing nation, Saudi Arabia was undergoing an educational crisis, and saw the Muslim Brotherhood as a “source of qualified educators, bureaucrats and engineers”, [104] all of whom were anxious to leave Egypt as a result of General Nasser’s clampdown on the Brotherhood after his attempted assassination. By the late 1970s, many of the most important proponents of Islamist terrorism were educating in Saudi Arabia, including Abdullah Azzam, Omar Abd al-Rahman, and Muhammad Qutb. It has been argued that Azzam, more than any other, laid the ideological foundations for Al-Qaeda, and is still considered “the strategic heart of Al-Qaeda.” [105] Azzam was responsible for recruiting Osama bin-Laden, and sending him to Afghanistan for the first time. [106] Thus, thanks to Saudi education initiatives, a whole generation was exposed to fundamentalism through every level of education. 

It is perhaps for this reason that Saudi citizens made up the largest group of foreign volunteers. It is alleged that the Saudi national airline even gave a “75% discount on airfare tickets to Pakistan to support travelers to Afghanistan who wished to answer the call of mobilization.” [107] The Saudi royal family were more than happy to see them leave. Although official figures and research regarding terrorist attacks within Saudi Arabia are famously difficult to obtain given the still (relatively) closed nature of Saudi society, what is clear, is that there was a burgeoning class of religious extremists who were becoming increasingly displeased with the House of Saud’s links to the West, and the perceived secularization of Saudi society. [108] This culminated in the seizure of the Grand Mosque at Mecca in 1979, by Sunni terrorists seeking the overthrow of the House of Saud. After a two-week siege, hundreds of militants, hostages, and security personnel were killed, with the Muslim world left in uproar. According to US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the 1979 ‘Mecca Incident’ also stoked “Shia dissidence” [109] in the east of Saudi Arabia, and conspiracy theories regarding US involvement prompted Vance to re-examine the security situation of the “35 plus thousand Americans” in Saudi Arabia. [110] As such, fearing further instability, it is of little surprise Crown Prince Fahd and Prince Turki declared that they did not want to be publicly linked with the CIA in Afghanistan. 

Following Osama Bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam out of Saudi Arabia were billions of dollars. Over the course of the war, Saudi Arabia spent $4 Billion per year on mosques, madrassas, preachers, students and textbooks to spread the Wahhabi creed over the next decades. [111] These camps and madrassas trained jihadis in Wahhabi ideology, and produced those militants who would form the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. In his work ‘Knights Under the Prophets Banner’, Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the founders of Al-Qaeda, viewed the finance supplied by Saudi Arabia in Peshawar as indispensable. According to him:

​“A jihadist movement needs an arena that would act like an incubator, where its seeds would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics and organizational matters.” [112]

Peshawar and Afghanistan, awash with money and ideology, was that incubator. 
​
It is noticeable that little of the fundamentalism and violence encouraged by the GID in Afghanistan made it back to Saudi Arabia. Thomas Hegghammer has noted that this seems “almost paradoxical”, in light of the fact that “Saudi militants were so active abroad in the 1990s, either in guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya, or as members of… Al-Qaeda.” [113] It has been argued that this may be a result of the result of Osama bin Laden’s “strong relations with the Saudi intelligence and with our (Saudi Arabia) embassy in Pakistan.” [114] According to Steve Coll, Bin Laden was said to have “a very good rapport with the ambassador and with all the Saudi ambassadors that served there” and there is some inference that this relationship continued until at least the late 1990s. [115] However, Hegghammer dismisses these ideas as “conspiracy theories” , stating that the lack of Al Qaeda operations in Saudi Arabia before 2003 can be explained by organizational factors. [116] He argues that before 1998, bin Laden “lacked the capability to mount the operations, while between 1999 and 2001 he lacked the intention”, [117] and as a result, there was no need to espouse the theory that “the Saudi regime had literally paid off bin Laden in exchange for security.” [118] Nevertheless, it is clear that ‘the Land of the Two Holy Mosques’ remained a critical source of money and fanatics for Al-Qaeda. 

Whatever the relationship between the Saudi state and Al-Qaeda, success in the Soviet-Afghan War meant that Jihad was given new legitimacy. Carol and Jamsheed Choksy put it best in their work ‘The Saudi Connection’. The Soviet-Afghan War:

​“…came to be seen as divine confirmation of jihad as necessary for Islam’s global ascendance. Wahhabism in turn emerged as the ‘indispensable ideology’… not just for the Saudi state but also for groups such as al-Qaeda, which took up the mission to enforce a purified form of Islam upon the world.” [119]

​Globalized Jihad rose from the same place the Soviet Union fell. The world moved into a new era.

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Conclusion

“What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the Collapse of the Soviet Union? Some agitated Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe?”

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The rhetorical question above, posed by Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1998, has lurked in the subtext throughout this examination of the Soviet-Afghan War and its consequences. [120] It is often used (as Brzezinski did) as a defense of the actions that the US and her allies took throughout the conflict, and as a way of redirecting responsibility for the current state of Afghanistan.

It is undoubtedly the case that the Soviet-Afghan War hastened the end of the Soviet Union. Whilst it is correct to caution that the Soviet Union was already in a state of decay by the 1980s, and that “economic dysfunction, political illegitimacy and institutional atrophy” [121] ran deeper than failed foreign intervention, in stating that, as Chalmers Johnson does, that “the demise of the Soviet Union owes more to Mikhail Gorbachev than to Afghanistan’s partisans” [122] is to miss what prompted many of Gorbachev’s reforms. There can be little debate that Afghanistan contributed to the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which mandated military intervention in nations where communism was under threat. In more practical terms, the years of military operations took an enormous toll on an already beleaguered economy, and “set in motion a round of East-West competition for which they were unprepared.” [123] In this regard, the fact that by their own estimation, the CIA had consistently overestimated the strength of communist states since the late 1950s, and “failed to see the deterioration that led to the collapse of the communist regimes” led to the enormous scope of Operation Cyclone, and ensured that the Soviets failed in their Afghan adventure. [124]

As for the “agitated Moslems”, it is important to remember that despite lurching from one tragedy to the next for the last 50 years, Afghanistan is not in a totally unique position as a political body. [125] Tom Lansford has argued that, like many other states still negotiating the legacy of colonialism, Afghanistan is “divided by ethnic and religious rivalries that reflect the legacy of the imperial powers and their acquisition and loss of territory.” [126] Whilst this is undoubtedly true, it is only part of the story. Religious, ethnic, and tribal violence was the status quo long before ‘The Great Game’, that British effort to deny the subcontinent from the Russian Empire, was played. As Nasreen Akhtar states, “Afghanistan has never been a peaceful country”, and “tribal rivalry and poverty” has not, does not, and never will, respect the rule of law. [127] As well, Afghanistan is politically and economically underdeveloped, and maintains its status as a rentier state, dependent on foreign aid for its survival. This was true before the Soviet invasion and had little to do with the actions of the US.

The problems Afghanistan faces today are the same as they have always faced. Like the British and Russian Empires before them, the Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia did not create the religious, ethnic, and tribal strife which haunts ‘the Graveyard of Empires’. Ironically, the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia created a unity in Afghanistan not seen for decades, if only for a short time, and if only motivated by the principle of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. However, when that mutual enemy is defeated, the status quo always returns. In this case, like the British and Russian Empires before them, the Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia aggravated existing troubles, and symbolized by the infamous Osama bin Laden, created a new enemy.

The US’ bullets and bombs, Pakistan’s training and politicking, and Saudi Arabia’s steady supply of cash and jihadis helped solve the problem of the Soviet Union, but sowed the seeds of a more mercurial and insidious opponent.
​
Operation Cyclone blew back.

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This paper was published in Volume I of The Dissident Review, available in paperback on Amazon.

You can follow Galahad on Twitter here: @_galaaus

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Endnotes

1.      National Security Archive, Soviet Invasion a Case of Mission Creep, October 13 2012, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.396.
2.      Milton Bearden, Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires, ‘Foreign Affairs 80 (6)’, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001).
3.      William Dalyrmple, Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan (London: Bloomsbury Paperbacks, 2014), p. 387.
4.      Rudyard Kipling, The Young British Soldier.
5.      Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Council, Worldwide Reaction to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: An Intelligence Memorandum, 1980, p. ii.
6.      Ibid, p. i.
7.      Chalmers Johnson, Abolish the CIA!, ‘London Review of Books 26 (20)’, (London: London Review of Books, 2004).
8.      Chalmers Johnson, Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008), p. 278.
9.      Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10 2001 (London: Penguin Books, 2004), p. 588.
10.    Chalmers Johnson, Abolish the CIA!
11.    George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War (London: Atlantic Books, 2007), p. 520.
12.    David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk and Bonny Lin, Blinders, Blunders and Wars: What America and China can Learn (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), p. 129.
13.    Larry P Goodwinson, Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and The Rise of The Taliban. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015), p. 51.
14.    Sir Martin Ewans, Afghanistan. (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 142.
15.    David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk & Bonny Lin, Blinders Blunders and Wars: What America and China Can Learn (RAND Corporation, 2014), p. 130.
16.    Ibid, p. 131.
17.    Steve Coll, Ghost Wars. (New York, N.Y: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 41.
18.    Ibid.
19.    Woodrow Wilson Centre, Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan, March 17 1989, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, p. 2.
20.    Coll, p. 46.
21.    Woodrow Wilson Centre, Report on the Situation in Afghanistan, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and Ponomarev to CPSU CC, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, p. 2.
22.    Vasily Mitrokhin, The KGB in Afghanistan. (Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2002), p. 46.
23.    CIA, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Implications for Warning, September 1980, p. 26.
24.    Ibid.
25.    Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovsky, Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979 (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2007), p. 3.
26.    National Security Archive, Concerning the Situation in ‘A’, Resolution of the CC CPSU, December 12 1979, p. 2.
27.    Lyakhovsky, p. 50.
28.    The National Security Archive, What Are The Soviets Doing In Afghanistan?, 1979, p. 1.
29.    Coll, p. 593.
30.    The National Security Archive, Reflections on the Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan, 1979
31.    Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkley: University of California Press), p. 254.
32.    Vincent Jauvert, Les Revelations d’un ancient conseiller de Carter, Le Nouvel Observateur (Paris: Groupe Nouvel Observateur, 1998), p. 76.
33.    Ibid.
34.    Howard Hart interviewed by Steve Coll (November 26th and November 27th, 2001) in Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 55.
35.    George Crille, Charlie Wilson’s War (London: Atlantic Books, 2007).
36.    Office of the Historian, Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, June 11 1980, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan.
37.    Ibid.
38.    Charles G. Cogan, Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979, ‘World Policy Journal 10(2)’, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 76.
39.    Ibid.
40.    Chester Pach, The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy, ‘Presidential Studies Quarterly 36 (1)’, (Washington D.C.: The Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2006), p. 76.
41.    Alan J. Kuperman, The Stinger Missile and US Intervention in Afghanistan, ‘Political Science Quarterly 114 (2)’, (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1999), p. 219.
42.    Ibid, p. 227.
43.    Oliver Roy, The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War (London: Brassey’s, 1991), p. 35.
44.    National Security Archive, Commander, US Army Operations Group, Impact of the Stinger Missile on Soviet and Resistance Tactics in AF, 1987, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 34.
45.    Ibid.
46.    Office of the Historian, Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary of State Schultz, March 20 1987, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-January 1989.
47.    Milton Bearden, Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires, ‘Foreign Affairs 80 (6)’, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001), p. 22.
48.    Peter Rodman, More Precious than Peace: Fighting and Winning the Cold War in the Third World (New York: Scribner, 1994), p. 221.
49.    Kuperman, The Stinger Missile, p. 236.
50.    Charles G. Cogan, Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979, ‘World Policy Journal 10(2)’, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 74.
51.    Kuperman, The Stinger Missile, p. 236.
52.    National Security Archive, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Political Analysis, The Soviets and the Tribes of Southwest Asia, September 23 1980, National Security Archive September 11th Sourcebook Volume II.
53.    Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Exporting Extremism, ‘Foreign Affairs 78 (6)’, (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), p. 32.
54.    Crille, Charlie Wilson’s War, p. 252.
55.    Tom Lansford, A Bitter Harvest: US Foreign Policy and Afghanistan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 129.
56.    Andrew Hartman, ‘The Red Template’: US Policy in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan, ‘Third World Quarterly 23 (30)’, (Oxford: Routledge, 2002), p. 483.
57.    Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (London: Penguin Books, 2004), p. 63.
58.    Marvin G. Weinbaum, War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role, Middle East Journal 45 (1), (Washington D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1991), p. 71.
59.    Scott, The Road to 9/11, p. 125.
60.    Office of the Historian, Letter from Pakistani General Zia to President Carter, May 9 1978, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan.
61.    Weinbaum, War and Peace in Afghanistan, p. 73.
62.    The Office of the Historian, Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance, January 2 1980, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XIX, South Asia.
63.    Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press) p. 256-257.
64.    The National Security Archive, George Shultz to Ronald Reagan: How Do We Make Use of the Zia Visit to Protect Our Strategic Interests in the Face of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Activities?, November 26, 1982.
65.    Office of the Historian, Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, October 1 1980, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XIX, South Asia.
66.    Jonah Blank, Pakistan and China’s Almost Alliance (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation)
67.    Muhammad Yousuf, Silent Soldier: The Man Behind the Afghan Jihad (Lahore, Jing Publishers, 1991), p. 99.
68.    Ijaz Ahmad Khan, Understanding Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban Policy, Pakistan Horizon 60 (2), (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2007), p. 145.
69.    Mary Ann Weaver, Pakistan: Deep Inside the World’s Most Frightening State (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux), p. 61.
70.    Office of the Historian, Telegram from the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, September 15 1978, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XIX, South Asia.
71.    Ibid.
72.    Khan, 2007, p. 145.
73.    Ibid.
74.    Office of the Historian, Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, August 8 1980, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan.
75.    Ibid.
76.    Ibid.
77.    National Security Archive, George Schultz to Ronald Reagan: How Do We Make Use of the Zia Visit to Protect Our Strategic Interests in the Face of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Activities?, November 26 1982, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 377.
78.    Khan, 2007, p. 151.
79.    Weinbaum, 1991, p. 151.
80.    Mohammad Yousuf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story (London: Leo Cooper, 1991) p. 40.
81.    Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, August 8 1980.
82.    Weinbaum, p. 77.
83.    Office of the Historian, Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), March 6 1980, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan.
84.    Weinbaum, p. 78.
85.    Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002), p. 232.
86.    Office of the Historian, Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, August 8 1980, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan.
87.    Office of the Historian, Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, January 9 1980, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan.
88.    Coll, 2004, p. 113.
89.    Steve Coll, Interview with William Piekney, January 14 2002, in Ghost Wars, p. 120.
90.    Shah M. Tarzi, Politics of the Afghan Resistance Movement: Cleavages, Disunity, and Fragmentation, ‘Asian Survey 31 (6)’, (California: University of California Press, 1991), p. 484.
91.    Open Society Foundations, Casting Shadows, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 1978-2001, ‘The Afghanistan Justice Project’ (London: Open Society Foundations, 2005), p. 59.
92.    Ibid, p. 63.
93.    A.Z. Hilali, The Costs and Benefits of the Afghan War for Pakistan, ‘Contemporary South Asia 11 (3)’ (London: Taylor and Francis, 2002), p. 304.
94.    Jan Goodwin, Caught in the Crossfire (London: Sphere Publishing), p. 45-46.
95.    Pervez Hoodbhoy, Afghanistan and the Genesis of Global Jihad, ‘Peace Research 37(1)’, (Winnipeg: Canadian Mennonite University, 2005), p. 2.
96.    Ibid.
97.    Office of the Historian, Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, March 27 1979, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan.
98.    Office of the Historian, Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown, March 14 1980, foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.
99.    Office of the Historian, Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to President Carter, July 7 1980, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980, Volume XIII, Afghanistan.
100.  Ibid.
101.  Office of the Historian, Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, June 11 1980, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan.
102.  Ibid.
103.  Office of the Historian, Telegram from the United States Liaison Office in Riyadh to the White House, February 5 1980, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.
104.  Trevor Stanley, Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism, ‘Terrorism Monitor 3 (14)’, (Washington D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 2005).
105.  Yousuf Aboul-Enein, The Late Sheik Abdullah Azzam’s Books: Part 2: Remedy for Muslim Victimisation (New York: Combatting Terrorism Centre at West Point, 2008), p. 3.
106.  Ibid.
107.  Muhammad Haniff Hassan, Mobilisation of Muslims for Jihad: Insights from the Past and their Relevance Today, ‘Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 5 (8)’ (Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, 2013), p. 12.
108.  Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad, Yes, But Not Revolution: Explaining the Extraversion of Islamist Violence in Saudi Arabia, ‘British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36 (3)’ (Oxford: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 2009), p. 400.
109.  Office of the Historian, Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, November 28 1979, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.
110.  Ibid.
111.  Carol E.B. Choksy and Jamsheed K. Choksy, The Saudi Connection: Wahhabism and Global Jihad, ‘World Affairs 178 (1)’ (Washington D.C.: Sage Publications Inc., 2015), p. 27.
112.  Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, in Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 154.
113.  Thomas Hegghammer, Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia, ‘International Affairs 84(4)’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 701.
114.  Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 88.
115.  Ibid.
116.  Hegghammer, Jihad, Yes But Not Revolution, p. 415.
117.  Thomas Hegghammer, Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia, ‘International Affairs 84(4)’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 709.
118.  Ibid.
119.  Choksy and Choksy, The Saudi Connection, p. 27.
120.  Vincent Jauvert, Les Revelations d’un ancient conseiller de Carter, Le Nouvel Observateur (Paris: Groupe Nouvel Observateur, 1998), p. 76.
121.  David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk and Bonny Lin, Blinders, Blunders and Wars: What America and China can Learn (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), p. 130.
122.  Chalmers Johnson, Abolish the CIA!, ‘London Review of Books 26 (20)’, (London: London Review of Books, 2004).
123.  Gompert et al., Blinders, Blunders and Wars, p. 130.
124.  Douglas J. MacEachin, CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the Charges, (Langley: CIA), p. 8.
125.  Jauvert, 1998, p. 76.
126.  Lansford, A Bitter Harvest: US Foreign Policy and Afghanistan, p. 184.
127.  Nasreen Akhtar, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban, ‘International Journal of World Peace 25 (4)’, (Minnesota: Paragon House, 2008), p. 50.